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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-3996
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
  v.
JAMES MELTON 
a/k/a Jay Mo
a/k/a John Melton
a/k/a Jason Melton
a/k/a David McGahae
James Melton,
               Appellant
                                             
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court Judge: The Honorable Robert B. Kugler
District Court No. 00-CR-00384-007
                                             
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 23, 2009
Before: BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges,
RESTANI, Judge*
2(Filed: July 30, 2009)
                                           
OPINION
                                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
James Melton appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion for a
reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The District Court had jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de
novo Melton’s eligibility for a reduction of sentence.  United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d
275, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2009).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District
Court’s order.
Beginning in August of 1999 and continuing to June of 2000, law enforcement
officials investigated a large-scale distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine in Camden,
New Jersey.  As a result of this investigation, an eleven-count Superseding Indictment
was filed in September of 2001.  Count one charged Melton and Patrick Stewart with
knowingly conspiring with others to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more
than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 5 grams of cocaine base in violation of  21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and 846.  Counts seven through eleven charged that
Melton knowingly and intentionally used a communication facility, namely a cell phone,
to facilitate the distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
843(b) and 843(d)(1).  A jury found Melton guilty of all of the charges against him.
3Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence
Report (PSR).  On the basis of evidence adduced at trial, the PSR stated that Melton was
responsible for “distribut[ing] approximately two kilograms of crack cocaine per month”
for thirteen months.  Because this quantity was “more than 1.5 kilograms of crack
cocaine” under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1), the PSR assigned a base offense level of 38. 
After other adjustments were made, Melton’s total offense level was 43 and his criminal
history was category II, yielding a guideline range of life.  Because this guideline range
exceeded his statutory maximum, Melton’s guideline range was reduced to forty years on
count one and four years each on counts seven through eleven.  
At sentencing, Melton objected to the paragraphs of the PSR that attributed more
than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine to him.  The District Court overruled Melton’s
objection.  The Court explained that it was “intimately familiar with the facts of this
case,” as it had presided over the trial, and it concluded that “the evidence which supports
the finding[s] in paragraphs 58, 61 and 62, is simply overwhelming.”  After hearing
argument on other objections and motions, the District Court sentenced Melton to 480
months on count one, and concurrent terms of 48 months each on counts seven through
eleven.
On appeal, we affirmed Melton’s conviction, but remanded for resentencing
pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). United States v. Melton, 131
Fed. App’x 21 (3d Cir. 2005).  On remand, the matter was reassigned to a new judge
4because the judge who presided at trial had resigned.  Although he had not presided at
trial, the District Judge noted that the PSR set forth Melton’s role in the conspiracy. 
Defense counsel renewed Melton’s earlier objections and argued that the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warranted a sentence below forty years.  With respect to
the drug quantity, the Court stated that it was “clear . . .  under any standard of evidence
that the amounts involved in this conspiracy are substantial, in excess of one and a half
kilograms,” and that the guideline calculation was accurate in light of the “huge drug
operation” giving rise to the charges.   The District Court resentenced Melton to the same
forty year term on count one, and concurrent terms of 48 months on counts seven through
eleven. 
A second appeal followed, which was unsuccessful.  Thereafter, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), Melton filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence based on
Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels for
crack cocaine offenses by two levels.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), App. C, Amend. 706
(2007).  The District Court denied the motion.  It explained that the amount of crack
cocaine attributed to Melton was more than the new “4.5 kilogram floor” in U.S.S.G. §
2D.1(c)(1) (2008 edition), thereby yielding the same base offense level of 38.  Because
the amendment did not lower Melton’s guideline range, the District Court reasoned that §
3582(c)(2) did not apply.   Melton filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the
District Court erred because the original sentencing judge found that he was responsible
5for only 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.  Such a finding would have lowered his base
offense level to 36 under Amendment 706.  The Court disagreed.  This timely appeal
followed.
Melton contends that the District Court erred by concluding that he was
responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.  He asserts that the original
sentencing judge found that he was responsible for only 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine,
which would result in a base offense level of 36 under Amendment 706.  Melton is
wrong.  The PSR specifically stated that Melton was responsible for “approximately two
kilograms of crack cocaine per month” and that the life of the conspiracy was 13 months,
a total of 26 kilograms.  Although Melton objected to these findings, the original
sentencing judge overruled the objections, citing the trial testimony and commenting that
the evidence supporting these findings “is simply overwhelming.”  Accordingly, the
District Court’s statement in its order denying the motion for reconsideration that the
original sentencing judge “did not find that defendant was responsible for only 1.5
kilograms of crack cocaine” was not erroneous.  Because the District Court relied upon
the findings of the PSR both at the resentencing and in denying the motion for reduction, 
we find no error in the District Court’s determination that under amended § 2D1.1(c) the
amount of crack cocaine attributable to Melton was more than 4.5 kilograms.  That
amount yields a base offense level of 38.  As a consequence, Melton’s guideline range is
Because Melton was ineligible for a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2),1
there is no need to consider his argument that the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) warrant
a further reduction of his term of imprisonment.
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unchanged and he is ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).   United1
States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We will affirm the order of the District Court.
